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1 In response to an anonymous reviewer we need
Sometimes it is a concern about a speciﬁc future even
Nielsen, 2009) but sometimes a timeless assumption
will take my coat and not the swimsuit; Atance & M
imagined possibilities (i.e., although one intends to do
oneself into) a past event that has actually taken pla
imagined events in contrast to retrospection for re-e
Open access under CC a b s t r a c t
We investigate the common development of children’s ability to ‘‘look back in time” (ret-
rospection, episodic remembering) and to ‘‘look into the future” (prospection). Experiment
1 with 59 children 5 to 8.5 years old showed mental rotation, as a measure of prospection,
explaining speciﬁc variance of free recall, as a measure of episodic remembering (retro-
spection) when controlled for cued recall. Experiment 2 with 31 children from 5 to 6.5
years measured episodic remembering with recall of visually experienced events (seeing
which picture was placed inside a box) when controlling for recall of indirectly conveyed
events (being informed about the pictures placed inside the box by showing the pictures
on a monitor). Quite unexpectedly rotators were markedly worse on indirect items than
non-rotators. We speculate that with the ability to rotate children switch from knowledge
retrieval to episodic remembering, which maintains success for experienced events but has
detrimental effects for indirect information.
 2010 Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
We naturally speak of ‘‘looking back on past events” or ‘‘looking forward to the future.” Clearly, we cannot literally look
back or forward in time (Martin, 2001). We cannot see the future or the past in the same way as we see an event unfolding
in front of us or behind us. The best we can do to capture past or future experiences of an event is to re-experience the event
(retrospection), or imagine experiencing a future event (prospection).1
The ability to retrospect in this sense has become a central feature for episodic memory with Tulving’s (1985) introduc-
tion of ‘‘autonoetic consciousness”, namely the awareness that remembering consists of ‘‘calling back into consciousness a
seemingly lost state that is then ‘immediately recognized as something formerly experienced’ (Ebbinghaus, 1885, p. 1).” Phi-
losophers spoke of ‘‘experiential memory,” at least since Locke (Owens, 1996). Although the different terms all capture the
phenomenon adequately, and ‘‘retrospection” does so in nice juxtaposition to ‘‘prospection,” we prefer ‘‘episodic remember-
ing” as our standard term. The choice of ‘‘remembering”, rather than ‘‘memory” is to emphasise that it is more than justnal on Self, Other and Memory.
.
to point out that the precise form of how the future is addressed in different prospection studies varies.
t (e.g., on the way to the puzzle room I have to think taking the needed implement with me; Suddendorf &
sufﬁces that one can treat as placed in the future (e.g., When(-ever) I go to a hibernal resort (tomorrow) I
eltzoff, 2005). In both cases the events one imagines experiencing (into which one projects oneself) are
the puzzle, it is not a fact that one will) in contrast to retrospection, where one re-experiences (projects
ce. By precedent and due to this commonality we keep using the term ‘‘prospection” for experiencing
xperiencing actual events.
BY-NC-ND license.
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notion of ‘‘mental time travel” (MTT: Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997): one has to not just
retrieve information about the past or think about the likely future. It requires projecting oneself as an experiencing agent
into the past or future. This distinction is also akin to the difference between having a theory of mind (Churchland, 1984;
Gopnik & Astington, 1988) as opposed to simulating one’s own (or other people’s) mental processes (Goldman, 2006; Gor-
don, 1986; Heal, 1986).
There is the strong and widespread, but not uncontested, intuition that these three abilities, theory of mind, episodic
remembering, and prospection belong together. They may be uniquely human abilities (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Roberts,
2002; Roberts et al., 2008; Suddendorf & Busby, 2003; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997, 2007; Wheeler et al., 1997). There is
now also fast growing empirical evidence from different quarters that episodic remembering (often investigated under
the label or as part of autobiographical memory), prospection, and theory of mind share a developmental schedule, and com-
mon neural substrate as shown in coactivation patterns and in common deﬁcits in clinical cases.
1.1. Brain imaging
Spreng, Mar, and Kim (2008) meta-analyzed, among other areas, all available brain imaging studies on theory of mind
(n = 30, as a random selection of 50), autobiographical memory (n = 19), and prospection (n = 6). Direct overlap was observed
in the medial temporal lobe (left parahypocampal gyrus: BA 36), medial parietal regions (precuneus, posterior cingulate,
bilaterally: BA 31), left temporo-parietal junction (BA 39, touching on BA 19), medial prefrontal cortex (frontal pole: BA
10). Convergence within same Brodmann areas were also observed in right TPJ, left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA
47), medial prefrontal cortex, and rostral anterior cingulate (BA 32), and lateral temporal lobe (BA 21, 22) especially left.
All these regions tend to also be activated by navigation problems and default processing (areas that tend to be more
strongly activated in the absence than in the presence of external stimulation). Two theories have been proposed as to
the common denominator underlying these common activations. Hassabis and Maguire (2007) suggested that all these tasks
require scene-construction and Buckner and Carroll (2007) that they all require projection of self into different time points or
spatial locations.
1.2. Brain injury
Patients without autonoetic consciousness in Tulving’s sense, i.e., amnesics with a special impairment of episodic remem-
bering and autobiographical memory, have been reported to also have severe deﬁcits of prospection, Patients K.C. (Tulving,
1985), R. (Stuss, 1991), M.L. (Levine et al., 1998), and D.B. (Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002). Loss of autonoetic consciousness
does, however, not lead inevitably to an impairment in theory of mind (patients K.C. and M.L.: Rosenbaum, Stuss, Levine, &
Tulving, 2007). This ﬁnding does not preclude theory of mind being necessary for autonoetic consciousness and episodic
remembering, in particular, it may be crucial as a developmental requirement or linkage. In fact, there is growing evidence
that theory of mind development around 4 and 5 years is linked to both, episodic remembering as well as prospection.1.3. Development
There are studies showing a speciﬁc relationship between advances in theory of mind and free recall as a measure of epi-
sodic remembering in relation to cued recall (Tulving, 1985). Perner and Ruffman (1995) were able to show that between 3
and 5 years, children’s improvement on free recall correlates signiﬁcantly with their understanding of how knowledge de-
pends on experience. Even when cued recall and verbal intelligence were partialled out, correlations stayed above .30. Tasks
used included children’s ability to explain why they know the contents of a box (How-do-you-know test: Wimmer, Hogrefe,
& Perner, 1988a; Wimmer, Hogrefe, & Sodian, 1988b), to distinguish a lucky guess from proper knowledge (Miscione, Mar-
vin, O’Brien, & Greenberg, 1978), and to understand which sense modality to use to ﬁnd out about colour or weight of an
object (O’Neill et al., 1992). These results were largely replicated by Naito (2003) on a Japanese sample. She also found a rela-
tionship between free recall and children’s ability to understand when they had learned a fact (Taylor, Esbensen, & Bennett,
1994).
Perner, Kloo, and Gornik (2007) used a different measure of episodic remembering. They contrasted recall of experienced
events with recall of indirectly conveyed events. In the experience condition children put cards with drawings of simple ob-
jects into a box. In the indirect-information condition they were blindfolded and so could not see which cards they put in-
side. They were afterwards shown on a monitor the pictures that were on these cards (information about individual cards
was thus indirectly conveyed). The reasoning was that children can have an episodic memory of putting a particular card
inside the box only when they experienced putting that card into the box. Only with this experience can they later re-expe-
rience their action. When blindfolded, they cannot experience which card they had put inside. When later shown what was
on these cards, they can only infer that they put that card inside the box. Hence there is no experience of putting that card
inside, which they could re-experience. Free recall of experienced events correlated with performance on various theory of
mind tasks (How-do-you-know, When-did-you-learn, and the modality-speciﬁcity test). Sprung (2008) and Sprung and Har-
ris (2009) found that theory of mind abilities (especially introspective understanding) modulates children’s ability to report
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growing the trauma.
Rapidly growing evidence suggests that children’s prospective abilities develop at about the same age. Moore, Barresi, and
Thompson (1998, Experiment 1) reported some correlations between 3- and 4-year-old children’s understanding of desire
and belief and of the beneﬁts of increased but delayed reward.
Bischof-Köhler (2000) investigated several abilities in a group of 3- to 4.5-year-olds with a large battery of tasks including
understanding of duration, theory of mind (false belief and deception), planning (shopping, need for preparation), delay of
gratiﬁcation, and motivational conﬂict. These abilities all underwent a noticeable improvement from 3 to 4.5 years and cor-
related signiﬁcantly even when children’s age was partialled out.
Atance and O’Neill (2005) investigated 3- to 4-year-olds’ ability to think about what to pack for a trip. About half of these
children went beyond packing typical (scripted) or attractive things. They also thought of providing for possible eventualities
(e.g., pack telephone to contact someone in case of an emergency). In another task children were given the beginning of a
drawing, e.g., a straight line, and then were asked what they wanted to draw on the basis of this ﬁrst element. There was
a strong correlation r = .65 between children’s ability to anticipate events in the trip task and their choice of a drawing that
was feasible with the given element (e.g., a sun but not a ladder starting from a circle) even when language ability was
controlled.
Atance and Meltzoff (2005) tested for mental time travel and found that 3 year olds above chance chose a suitable item
(e.g., winter coat) for going to a snowy place (as shown in a photograph) and they were able to explain their choice by ref-
erence to their future need created by that environment. By 4 and 5 years all children could do this. It remains unclear
whether this shows children’s ability to project themselves into the future state of going to a wintery landscape. They might
just know about the need for winter coats in a cold environment. Atance and Meltzoff (2006) overly satiated children on salty
pretzels, which made them change their preference from pretzels to water. Even 5 year old children showed little sign of
understanding that the next day their preference would return to pretzels. They predicted a lasting preference for water.
Busby and Suddendorf (2005) simply asked 3- to 5-year-old children what they had done yesterday and what they were
likely to do tomorrow. Discounting general, scripted answers (e.g., ‘‘I played”) there was a marked improvement in children’s
ability to report past and likely future episodes. Suddendorf and Nielsen (2009) tested 3- and 4-year-olds on a simple prob-
lem (e.g., use a triangular key to open a box). When the key was not available children went to another room and played for
15 min. Before returning to the ﬁrst room they were given the choice among three different keys (one triangular) and asked
which one they would like to bring with them to the room. Three-year-olds chose at random, while 4-year-olds chose the
triangular key above chance (with plenty of room for improvement).
Atance and Jackson (2009) assessed different aspects of future thinking in 3- to 5-year-old preschoolers, including
mental time travel (Atance & Meltzoff, 2005; Busby & Suddendorf, 2005), delay of gratiﬁcation, planning (simple version
of Tower of Hanoi, Carlson, Moses, & Claxton, 2004), and prospective memory (remembering to do something after ﬁn-
ishing something else: Kvavilashvili, Messer, & Ebdon, 2001). Children improved on all these tasks and performance be-
tween all tasks was correlated but correlations were dependent on age and receptive vocabulary. Ford, Shum, and Driscoll
(2009) found that prospective memory performance in 4- to 6-year-olds was related to inhibitory ability and understand-
ing false beliefs.
Finally, Russell, Alexis, and Clayton (2010) let 3–5 year old children play blow-football for which one needed to bring a
straw for blowing and as player on the blue (as opposed to the red) side a box to stand on as that side of the table was other-
wise too high for children at this age. Children were asked questions framed in the past, present and future about what they
themselves or another child needed to play on the blue side. The variable was whether they thought of both required items
or not. In case children gave different answers for themselves than for their peer, the authors reasoned, this is a likely sign
that children bring to bear their own perspective when imagining how they had played, or were going to play, i.e., project
themselves into the role of player. Systematic comparison of self and other was only carried out for present (Experiment 4)
and future (Experiments 2 and 3). In particular, 4-year-olds gave similar answers for self and other in the present and for
other in the future, but ignored their own needs for the future. This was interpreted as evidence that between 3 and 5 years
children become able to project themselves into future situations. Supportive evidence for this age trend comes from Pren-
cipe and Zelazo (2005), who found that 3 year olds make wise choices of delaying an immediate small reward for a larger one
later when choosing for another person but not for themselves. This discrepancy ceases around 4 years.
1.4. Autism
The spectrum of autism consists of a developmental disorder that affects the very triad of theory of mind, retrospection,
and prospection. Children with autism spectrum disorder tend to have problems with basic theory of mind tasks (Baron-Co-
hen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989) or the least impaired cases (Asperger’s syndrome) have def-
icits appreciating subtle mental interactions like sarcasm, jokes, etc. (Happé, 1994). They also have executive deﬁcits
(Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 1991; for a review, see, Hill, 2004), which tend to be more pronounced for planning (pro-
spection) than for inhibition. When tested for memory their free recall seems to be speciﬁcally impaired over cued recall
and recognition (Boucher & Lewis, 1989; Boucher & Warrington, 1976; Bowler, Gardiner, & Grice, 2000; Tager-Flusberg,
1991) and even the highest functioning individuals with Asperger syndrome give fewer ‘‘remember” judgments in recogni-
tion tasks (Bowler, Gardiner, & Gaigg, 2007) than unimpaired people.
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The neurophysiological and developmental evidence leaves little doubt that there is some common ground for theory of
mind, episodic remembering and prospective abilities. Whether the co-emergence of these different abilities and their shar-
ing of common cerebral structures is good evidence for mental time travel, i.e., for the ability to re- and pre-experience past
or future events as the common basis remains an open question. The evidence for that claim is weak in two respects: few of
the reviewed studies attempt to isolate speciﬁc cases of episodic remembering (retrospection: re-experiencing a past situa-
tion by projecting oneself into the past) as opposed to merely retrieving knowledge about the past, and of projecting oneself
into a future experience (prospection) as opposed to knowing what is likely to happen in the future or knowing what is
needed in an imagined future situation. Consequently, the developmental synchrony could easily be explained by quite gen-
eral features, e.g., thinking about the past and future.
The contrast between free and cued recall does provide some measure for teasing out the retrospective aspects of mem-
ory. Its usefulness is based on Tulving’s (1985) argument that free recall is more dependent on the availability of episodic
traces than is cued recall. Hence, if free recall correlates speciﬁcally with progress in theory of mind when controlling for
cued recall, then that correlation ought to be due to changes in episodic remembering (Perner, 1990) and not some more
general ability to think about or retrieve information about the past. The link between free recall and episodic remembering,
one has to admit, is rather weak. Free recall does not depend completely on episodic remembering (even in free recall a few
items can come to mind automatically). Moreover, free recall is not exclusively helped by episodic remembering, which can
also enhance cued recall. The contrast between memory of experienced events and indirectly conveyed events (Perner et al.,
2007) is somewhat sharper in this respect. It takes advantage of the fact that only experienced events can possibly be re-
experienced. Indirectly conveyed events should, therefore, not proﬁt at all from the developing ability to remember
episodically.
The self-other contrast used by Russell et al. (2010) helps isolate the prospective aspects of anticipating future needs. It
also allows for projection into the past, unfortunately, not for remembering any past event but only for ﬁguring out what was
needed for a past action as can be seen from their example test question: ‘‘. . . point to the two things you think the little girl
had to have to play blow-football on the blue side?” (Section 2.1.3). Even for prospection this method depends on the risky
background assumption that the difference between predicting one’s own future needs and predicting someone else’s future
needs reﬂects an inability of projection, which is primarily applicable to oneself and not to others. For believers in simulation
theory projection is also applied in the case of others. More generally, the difference can be due to factors that tend to inter-
fere more strongly in the case of self than other.
In sum, the claim for a speciﬁc developmental relationship between the ability to retrospect (episodic remembering) and
prospection rests on evidence that can be given a more general interpretation (e.g., thinking about different times) or fails to
provide the needed correlations: Perner and Ruffman (1995), Naito (2003) and Perner et al. (2007) only provide evidence for
retrospection and ToM but not prospection. Russell et al. only provide evidence for prospection. Our prime objective is to
provide evidence for a speciﬁc developmental relationship between retrospection (episodic remembering) and prospection.
To capture retrospection we use the free-cued recall contrast in our ﬁrst experiment and the experienced-indirectly con-
veyed contrast in our second experiment. For measuring children’s prospective abilities (the study by Russell et al. was pub-
lished well after our research was conceived and conducted) we relied on children’s ability to engage in mental rotation. We
used the child appropriate simpliﬁcation by Estes (1998) of the original tasks by Shepard and Metzler (1971). Children were
shown pairs of teddy bears (monkeys in Estes’ original study) with one arm raised. Children had to judge whether the mon-
keys had raised the same side arm (e.g., both their left arm) or an arm on different sides (one left the other right). This is easy
if the creatures stand side by side but increasingly difﬁcult if one of them is rotated sideways (see Fig. 1). An easy solution is
to take the tilted picture and rotate it back to upright. However, children are not allowed to do this physically. In that case
one can rotate it mentally by forming an image of what one sees and rotate the image and then compare the rotated image of
the tilted ﬁgure with the perception of the other ﬁgure. This procedure is an instance of prospection: one pre-experiences an
actual rotation of the tilted ﬁgure. And the reaction times tell us whether a child used this method because mental rotation
results in a linear increase of reaction time with the degree of rotation (Shepard & Metzler, 1971). Estes (1998) reported that
children start using this method between 4 and 6 years.Fig. 1. Examples of stimuli used for the mental rotation task in both experiments.
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2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Fifty-nine children (25 girls and 34 boys) participated in the study. Children came from a nursery school in Upper
Austria and two after-school care clubs, one in the city of Salzburg and one in Upper Austria. Most participants came
from a middle-class background. Children’s ages ranged from 4, 11 (years, months) to 8, 7 (M = 6, 8, SD = 13.67 months).
To analyze and display age trends, we divided the children into three approximately same sized age-groups: Twenty chil-
dren from 4, 11 to 6, 0 (M = 5, 5, SD = 3.99 months), 17 children ranging in age from 6, 1 to 7, 4 (M = 6, 8, SD = 5.51 months),
and 22 children ranging in age from 7, 5 to 8, 7 (M = 7, 11 SD = 4.4 months).2.1.2. Design
Each child was tested individually in a quiet room of the nursery school or after-school care club. Children were given two
memory tasks (one with free and one with cued recall). In addition, children received a computerized mental rotation task
based on Estes (1998) and an age-appropriate measure of verbal intelligence (verbal subtest of KISTE, Häuser, Kasielke, &
Scheidereiter, 1994; or HAWIK-III, Tewes, Rossmann, & Schallberger, 1999).
All tasks were administered in two sessions a few days apart. Each session started with presentation of items for the
memory task and ended with recall of memory items. Between presentation and recall of memory items, half of the chil-
dren were given the mental rotation task in the ﬁrst session and the verbal intelligence measure in the second session;
the other half received these tasks in the opposite order. Half of the children received the free recall task in the ﬁrst
session and the cued recall task in the second session; the other half started with the cued recall task.2.1.3. Procedure and materials
2.1.3.1. Mental rotation task (Estes, 1998). In a warm-up phase, children were presented with an odd one out game. They were
shown three bears in upright position (two of them both raising the same arm and one of them raising a different arm). Chil-
dren were asked to select the bear that was different from the other two.
Then, children were asked to play a computerized mental rotation task presented on a notebook computer using the soft-
ware package Presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems Inc., http://www.neuro-bs.com). Children were told to press the but-
ton with the smiling face if two bears both raising the same arm appeared on the screen and to press the button with the sad
face if two bears each raising a different arm appeared.
After experimenter and child had jointly completed six training trials, children were asked to play on their own. The test
phase comprised 56 trials. Each trial consisted of a pair of bears. The bear on the left was always upright, whereas the bear on
the right appeared in seven different orientations. He was either upright (i.e., 0 rotation) or rotated clockwise in 30 incre-
ments up to 180. In addition, each bear raised one of his arms. For half of the trials, both bears raised the same arm (i.e. both
right or both left). For the other half of trials, the bears raised different arms (i.e. the left bear raised its right arm and the right
bear raised its left arm, or the reverse). In total, there were 28 different stimulus pairs: two ‘‘same” and two ‘‘different” pairs
for each of the seven different orientations. Each child was given these 28 different stimulus pairs twice in a ﬁxed random
order. After the ﬁrst 28 trials, there was a short 2 min break.
Children had to press as fast as possible the button marked with a smiling face if the two bears had raised their same side
arm and the button marked with a sad face if the bears had raised different side arms. Children had to keep their index ﬁn-
gers positioned on the response buttons throughout the trial block. Children were asked if they were ready before the exper-
imenter initiated the next trial. Correct responses were followed by a brief tune, errors by silence. No other feedback was
given. After Trials 5, 28, and 56, children were asked how they could tell if the two bears had raised their same arms or
not. Sample stimuli are shown in Fig. 1.2.1.3.2. Memory tasks. For the memory tasks two sets of 20 coloured pictures (21  29.7 cm) of familiar objects or animals
were created (similar to Perner & Ruffman, 1995, Exp. 1). Each set comprised ﬁve categories, with four items in each category
(see Appendix A for list of items). Pictures were presented in a ﬁxed random order. Each child received both sets. Half of the
children were given Set 1 for the free recall task and Set 2 for the cued recall task. For the other half the two sets were
exchanged.
Children were told to look carefully at each picture they are going to see, because they will be asked about them later.
Each picture was shown for 5 s and the child had to name it. Slight misidentiﬁcations (e.g., calling the farm a barn) were
accepted. Completely wrong answers were corrected.
After the intervening task (mental rotation or verbal intelligence measure), children were reminded: ‘‘I’ve shown you
some pictures earlier on. Can you remember?” In the free recall condition, children were then simply asked ‘‘What was in
these pictures?” In the cued recall condition, they were asked for each category, e.g.: ‘‘There were some animals, what were
they?”
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The difference between the number of correct recalls and the number of false alarms was used as a measure of recall
accuracy.
2.2. Results and discussion
First, children’s performance on the memory tasks and on the mental rotation task was analyzed separately, and then we
looked at the relationship between these tasks.
2.2.1. Memory tasks
Recall accuracy (hits minus false alarms) on the two memory tasks was analyzed by an analysis of variance with age-
group (younger, middle, older) as between participants factor and recall (free, cued) as a within participants factor. There
was a signiﬁcant main effect of recall, F(1, 56) = 49.61, p < .001, partial g2 = .47. No other effect was signiﬁcant p > .50. Cor-
relation between free and cued recall accuracy was r = .17, p > .19.
2.2.2. Mental rotation
We ﬁrst looked at children’s number of correct answers. There was a clear bimodal distribution. One group of 24 children
had values from 24 to 38 normally distributed around the mean of 30.21 correct, which is just two items more than the
guessing level of 28 (of 56 items): t(23) = 3.35, p < .003. Presumably these are the children who did not resort to rotation,
without which they could only judge about two items consistently correctly. There were no children with values 39–41
and the remaining 35 children attained values from 42 to 55 with a mean of 49.89 correct.
To see how children managed to give correct answers they were classiﬁed as rotators or non-rotators according to the two
criteria used by Estes (1998). For each child a regression analysis was computed for the median reaction times for each angle
as dependent and angle of rotation as independent variable. When the regression coefﬁcient (slope) was signiﬁcantly differ-
ent from zero the child was classiﬁed as a ‘‘rotator according to RT”. Children were also asked at the end how they had ap-
proached the task. If they indicated that they had rotated the stimuli in their mind (e.g., ‘‘I rotated the bear in my head”) they
were classiﬁed as ‘‘rotators according to explanation”. The other children gave no insightful answer (e.g., ‘‘I just know it”).
Correlation of these measures with the number correct solutions showed r = .64 for explanation, r = .66 for reaction time,
and r = .67 for rotation by reaction time and explanation. We use this binary classiﬁcation as ‘‘rotators” (rotators by RT
and by explanation) vs. ‘‘non-rotators” for all further computations (we checked that the interpretations stay the same if
anyone of the other two is used). This way of classifying children into rotators and non-rotators had a marginally signiﬁcant
relation with age (r = .25, p = .052) but a clear relationship with verbal intelligence (r = .40, p = .002).
2.2.3. Interrelations between retrospection and prospection
The argument about the relationship between type of recall and episodic remembering is that both kinds are (can be)
helped by the availability of episodic traces. This can be equally strong, so that no interactive effect of the availability of epi-
sodic traces on free vs. cued recall can be expected. However, free recall is more dependent on episodic traces than cued re-
call (which proﬁts to a large degree from the availability of the cues). Availability of episodic traces should, therefore,
correlate more strongly with free than with cued recall, since more alternative factors inﬂuence cued than free recall. The
theoretical claim is that the ability for episodic remembering requires the ability to project oneself into the past and that
the same projective ability is required in the mental rotation task by projecting oneself as an observer of a future or hypo-
thetical action (rotating one of the items to be compared). On those grounds we expect that mental rotation should show a
signiﬁcant correlation with free recall even when any correlation with cued recall has been partialled out.
Table 1 shows the correlations between relevant variables in the upper right corner above the main diagonal. Partial cor-
relations with age and verbal intelligence taken into account are shown for the remaining variables in italics below the main
diagonal. The correlation between rotation and free recall remains at least marginally signiﬁcant but the correlation between
rotation and cued recall reaches only about half its size. More importantly, when cued recall is partialled out the partialTable 1
Correlations and partial correlations with age and verbal intelligence controlled.
1 2 3 4 5
1. Age – .17 .25+ .10 .18
2. Verbal intelligence – .40** .29* .39**
3. Mental rotation – .35** .29*
4. Free recall: accuracy .26+ – .17
5. Cued recall: accuracy .14 .06 –
Note: Numbers in italics – partial correlations after partialling out age and verbal intelligence.
+ p < .06.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
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(as measured by free recall beyond cued recall) is developmentally linked with prospection (as measured by mental
rotation). In contrast, when free recall is partialled out the partial correlation of rotation with cued recall is weaker but does
stay marginally signiﬁcant (pr = .25, p = .06), which attests to the fact, pointed out earlier, that both free and cued recall proﬁt
from the ability of episodic remembering to project oneself back into the past. This highlights the need for a more discerning
measure of episodic remembering in the next experiment.
3. Experiment 2
Experiment1provided someevidence that thedevelopmentof prospection, assessedby theability to engage inmental rota-
tion, is speciﬁcally linked to retrospection (free recall)whencontrolling for general ability to retrieve informationabout thepast
(cued recall). The differential performance on free over cued recall is a veryweakmeasure of episodic remembering (retrospec-
tion) since both types of recall can beneﬁt to equal amounts from the availability of episodic traces. The only difference is that
the overall variance of free recall should bemore strongly dominated by episodic abilities than the variance of cued recall. This
weakness is also reﬂected in the controversyover Tulving’s (1985) claim that relativelymore items recalled in free recall should
be judged as ‘‘remembered” than in cued recall (Jones & Roediger, 1995; Roediger &McDermott, 1995; vs. Hamilton&Rajaram,
2003).
In this second experiment we try to get stronger evidence for a speciﬁc developmental link by employing a contrast that
depends more directly on the availability of episodic traces. A suitable contrast is between (directly) experienced events and
events about which one was indirectly informed (e.g., through verbal or pictorial media). Only experienced events can be re-
experienced. Though imagined experiences can be mistaken for re-experiences (false memories) this should be relatively
rare if children are not instructed to vividly imagine the event about which they are indirectly informed. Under these pre-
mises we can predict that development of retrospective abilities (episodic remembering) should uniquely improve recall of
experienced events but not at all (except for the occasional false memory) recall of indirectly conveyed events. Following the
method used by Perner et al. (2007) we had children put cards with different pictures into a box. In the direct-experience
condition the children saw the picture on each card as they put it into the box. In the indirect-information condition they
put the cards into the box when being blindfold and afterwards they were shown on a monitor the pictures on those cards.
We expect that children’s ability to engage in mental rotation should coincide with improved recall of directly experienced
items but not of indirectly conveyed items.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Thirty-one children (16 girls and 15 boys) from two nursery schools in towns near the city of Salzburg participated in the
study. Most participants came from a middle-class background. Children’s ages ranged from 5, 0 (years, months) to 6, 4
(M = 5, 10; SD = 4.72 months). For later analysis children were divided into a younger (n = 13, M = 5, 5; ranging from 5, 0
to 5, 10) and an older group (n = 18, M = 6, 1; ranging from 5, 11 to 6, 4).
3.1.2. Design
Each child was tested individually in a quiet room of the nursery school. Children were given two memory tasks (one with
direct experience and one with indirect information). In addition, children received the mental rotation task based on Estes
(1998) described in Experiment 1. All tasks were administered in three sessions a few days apart. In the ﬁrst session, children
received the mental rotation task and a modality-speciﬁcity task in counterbalanced order.2 In the second and third session,
one of the two memory tasks was given. In each session, presentation and recall of memory items were separated by a 10-min
delay. Half of the children started with the direct-experience condition and were then given the indirect-information condition.
For the other half, the order was reversed.
3.1.3. Procedure and materials
The mental rotation task (Estes, 1998) was administered as described in Experiment 1.
3.1.3.1. Memory tasks. For the memory tasks, four sets of 12 coloured pictures (21  29.7 cm) of familiar objects, animals, or
human beings were used. Set 1 and Set 2 were administered in the ﬁrst session. Set 3 and Set 4 were given in the second
session. In each session, half of the children were given a particular set as test items and the other set as distractor items.
For the other half, the two sets were exchanged, so that each set was equally often used as test or distractor set in the direct
experience and in the indirect-information memory task.
The experimenter presented the 24 pictures (test and distractor items), one after the other, alternating between items
from each set. As each picture was produced, the child was asked to name it. If necessary (which was rarely the case),
the experimenter provided the correct label.2 This task was included to make good use of the retention time. It was part of a project of a student who helped testing the children. This task will not be
further analysed.
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were allowed to look at each picture for 2 s and were instructed to keep these pictures in mind. In the indirect-information
memory task, children were also asked to place the 12 test items into a box but they were blindfolded so that they could not
see the pictures. After having placed the 12 items into the box, they were shown ‘‘what these 12 pictures had depicted” by
means of a computerized presentation. Each picture was shown for two seconds, and children were instructed to keep these
pictures in mind. After a 10-min delay, children were asked in both memory tasks, ‘‘Do you remember the pictures you put
into the box?” If children answered with an item that was not put inside the box it was scored as a false alarm.
On both memory tasks, the number of correct recalls (hits) and the number of false alarms (if children mentioned items
that were not put inside the box) were recorded. Mostly, false alarms comprised items from the distractor set used in the
familiarization phase. The distractor set was introduced to get a more precise measure of remembering the pictures being
put into the box as opposed to mere familiarity with the pictures. The contrast between recall of items placed inside the
box with false alarms (mostly items that children were familiarized with but did not put inside) sharpens the detection
of episodic memories in contrast to mere familiarity answers. For instance, a child who recalls two correct items and no dis-
tractors is comparable with one who recalls 12 targets and 10 distractors. Both children vastly differ in recall of familiar
items (pictures) but are similar in terms of memory for items placed inside the box. This is critical, because our manipulation
of direct experience and indirect knowledge pertains to the placing of cards into the box, not to familiarity with the pictures
(they are directly experienced in both conditions). For this reason it is essential to rely not only on the quantity of pictures
recalled (number of placed pictures recalled in relation to all pictures placed into the box) but also check for accuracy (num-
ber of placed pictures recalled in relation to all pictures recalled; as this terminology is used by Koriat and Goldsmith (1996,
p. 177)). A measure that captures both these aspects common in signal detection theory is d0 which is based on the difference
between hits and false alarms. This is typical for forced choice recognition tasks and rarely used with recall (Koriat & Gold-
smith, 1996, p. 183). Following this approach, we use the difference between number correct items recalled minus number
false alarms as our critical indicator of episodic recall and refer to it, for want of a shorter label and in line with signal detec-
tion theory, as: recall accuracy.
3.2. Results
First, children’s performance on the memory tasks and on the mental rotation task was analyzed separately, and then we
looked at the relationship between these tasks.
3.2.1. Memory tasks
Recall accuracy (hits minus false alarms) was subjected to an analysis of variance with age-group as between participants
factor and experience (direct, indirect) as a within participants factor. There was a signiﬁcant interaction between age-group
and experience, F(1, 29) = 4.31, p < .047, partial g2 = .13. Whereas the recall of directly experienced items increased with age
from 2.69 to 3.56 items, recall of indirect items declined with age from 3.46 to 2.50 items. This unexpected decline will be
discussed below when looking at the relationship with mental rotation (prospection). No other effect was signiﬁcant p > .70.
Correlation between direct and indirect recall accuracy was r = .42, p = .019.
3.2.2. Mental rotation
The results mirror those of Experiment 1. The numbers of correct answers range from 28 to 54. There was again a strong
correlation (r = .57, p = .001) between number correct solutions and rotation by explanation (r = .38, p = .033), rotation by
reaction time (r = .46, p = .01), and rotation by reaction and explanation (r = .58, p = .001). As in Experiment 1 we use rotation
by reaction time and explanation for our further analyses. This classiﬁcation had a marginal correlation with age in Exper-
iment 1 but this time it had no correlation with age at all (r = .00), which is probably due to the much narrower age range in
this experiment.
3.2.3. The relation between retrospection and prospection
The contrast between directly experienced versus indirectly conveyed events works differently than the contrast between
free and cued recall in Experiment 1. While free and cued recall can proﬁt from episodic remembering, only directly expe-
rienced events can do so, because only experienced events can be re-experienced. This means that the emerging ability for
episodic remembering should enhance recall of directly experienced events but not recall of indirectly conveyed events.
Moreover, re-experiencing past events (episodic remembering) and pre-experiencing imagined events for mental rotation
require the same ability of projecting oneself as an observer. Hence, we expect that children who can use mental rotation
will have better recall of directly experienced events than of indirectly conveyed events. Children, who fail to use rotation,
will show no, or at least a much reduced, difference in recall.
An analysis of variance of recall accuracy (number of hits minus false alarms) with rotation (rotation by RT and explana-
tion: rotators vs. non-rotators) as a between subjects factor and experience (experienced vs. indirectly conveyed events)
showed signiﬁcant main effects of rotation (F(1, 29) = 5.16, p = .031, partial g2 = .15) and experience (F(1, 29) = 4.51,
p = .042, partial g2 = .13), and a highly signiﬁcant rotation  experience interaction (F(1, 29) = 7.83, p = .009, partial
g2 = .21). This interaction was predicted. However, the form of the interaction as displayed in the left panel of Fig. 2 harbours
Fig. 2. Results for rotators and non-rotators on three different memory measures in Experiment 2.
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This decline in accuracy for indirectly conveyed events persists for rotators-by-RT but not for rotators-by-explanation
(p = .016), although the pattern of results is still very similar. This sharp decline (by 3.2 items) in accuracy (hits minus false
alarms) is, as the centre panel in Fig. 2 shows, less pronounced (1.6 items) for hits (items correctly recalled) but still signif-
icant (interaction: (F(1, 29) = 4.81, p = .037, partial g2 = .14)). At the same time the number of false alarms increases more
sharply for indirectly conveyed items than experienced items (F(1, 29) = 4.45, p = .045, partial g2 = .13) as the right panel
in Fig. 2 shows.
3.3. Discussion
The ability to engage in mental rotation had a strong differential effect on children’s ability to recall directly experienced
events and to recall indirectly conveyed events. The ﬁnding, however, contained a great surprise: the differential effect did
not consist in rotators’ better recall of experienced events but was due to their worse recall of indirectly conveyed events.
This unexpected decline in recall of indirectly conveyed items does, nevertheless, conﬁrm a trend observed in two experi-
ments by Perner et al. (2007), where recall of indirectly conveyed items declined with increased theory of mind competence.
What seemed initially a curious and haphazard ﬁnding now looks increasingly robust: As children improve their theory of
mind and develop mental rotation skills their recall of indirectly conveyed information declines.
It is difﬁcult to ﬁnd an obvious explanation for this decline. One could suspect that the reason lies in the unusual proce-
dure of the indirect condition. But why should the more sophisticated rotators become confused by this procedure, when
adults ﬁnd it unusual but clear and perform as well as in the more normal experience condition (Stöttinger, 2006). The only
plausible but highly speculative explanation has been brieﬂy alluded to by Perner et al. (2007, p. 480). The younger children
use their non-episodic recall (knowledge retrieval) for both conditions more or less successfully. Then when their theory of
mind competence increases and become able to project themselves as past perceivers of experienced events they switch to
using episodic recall. This switch may (Perner et al., 2007) or may not (current Experiment 2) help them immediately to re-
call more items than with non-episodic recall. In any case, this switch does not work for indirectly conveyed items and chil-
dren’s performance declines. Presumably some time after discovering episodic recall children will realize that it does not
work in every case and will readjust their strategy for indirect information.
Eventually they may also discover the possibility of indirect episodic recall for indirect information. That is, when told
about an event they should not try to re-experience (episodically remember) the event (e.g., putting the crocodile into
the box) but to remember the information event (i.e., remember the crocodile appearing on the monitor and the instruc-
tions that pictures on the monitor were on the cards put inside the box). It is left to future studies to explore this
development.
4. General discussion
We have presented some data showing that prospection (as measured by children’s ability to engage in mental rotation)
is related to retrospection (episodic remembering: as measured by variance shared with free recall when controlling for cued
recall and by the difference between recall of experienced events (which can be re-experienced) versus recalling indirectly
conveyed events (which cannot be re-experienced). Our expectation was that recall of indirect information would be unaf-
fected while recall of experienced events, which can be re-experienced, would increase with children’s ability to mentally
rotate.
Contrary to expectations recall of experienced events was unaffected while children’s recall of indirect information
dropped drastically with their ability to engage in mental rotation. Although, retrospectively (sic!), this trend was already
apparent in investigations of children’s theory of mind competence (Perner et al., 2007), the sharpness of this trend with
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marks a change in recall strategy. Instead of retrieving knowledge as before, children expect to ﬁnd answers by trying to
re-experience the relevant events. This is a successful replacement for the old strategy in the case of experienced events
but fails miserably for indirect information about events. Despite these unexpected results we were able to demonstrate
a developmental link between retro- and prospection that is Difﬁcult to reduce to a more general connection, e.g., under-
standing time, which could account for existing data as reviewed in the Introduction.
The speciﬁc connection we identiﬁed is children’s ability to project themselves mentally as experiencing events. This
characterisation is commensurable with the neurocognitive suggestions of self-projection (Buckner & Carroll, 2007) and
scene-construction (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007). In fact, on our view these two abilities are necessary complements: To pro-
ject oneself as an observer of events at different times one has to be able to project one self into different times AND be able
to reconstruct the scenes that one is to observe.
Our results are less compatible with the ages observed in earlier developmental studies. Results from many of the studies
reviewed earlier that looked at prospection suggest that the main development takes place between 3 and 5 years, though
not from all studies. For instance, Atance and Meltzoff’s (2006) report that 5-year olds still could not imagine/anticipate that
their current desire for water induced by overfeeding on salty pretzels will have reverted next day to their usual desire for
pretzels. The fact that prospection as measured with mental rotation points to later development might mean that the stud-
ies that see the development completed by 5 years did not assess children’s ability to project themselves as observers (exper-
iencers) of events at different times but assessed their knowledge about events in the past or future.
Research on children’s retrospection (episodic remembering) also ﬁnds development in this age bracket but clearly also
points to improvements beyond the age of 5 years. The original studies by Perner and Ruffman (1995) and also Naito (2003)
included children up to 7 years and their more difﬁcult theory of mind tasks tended to show the stronger correlations with
measures of episodic remembering. These ﬁndings are, therefore, more in line with the developments documented in the
present studies.
We want to end with more general considerations about the methodological difﬁculties in assessing young children’s and
non-verbal creatures’ explanations and subjective phenomenology. The autonoetic awareness of re-experiencing a formerly
experienced event is something very subjective, in the sense that evidence for it comes exclusively from introspective verbal
reports. With adult participants in memory experiments the relevant experience has been assessed by the ‘‘R–K” test. People
have to judge their subjective experience of recall or recognition as one of merely knowing (K) what had happened (presen-
tation of an item) or remembering (R) this event. This test is less than straight forward with adults, its value highly contro-
versial (Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 2004; Gardiner & Richardson-Klavehn, 2000; Stöttinger, Aigner, Hanstein, & Perner, 2009;
Stöttinger, Kaiser, & Perner, 2009) and its use for young children beyond contemplation. The only solution seems to be an
objectively measurable indicator of these subjective phenomena.
This enterprise requires a ﬁne instrument in order to distinguish between knowing what happened and re-experiencing
(remembering) the event retrospectively, and between knowing what will happen and pre-living the likely event in prospec-
tion. The instrument has to be precise because both kinds of mental processes can, in principle, produce the required infor-
mation about the world. They are ‘‘computationally equivalent”: both can give the correct answer to the questions posed,
e.g.: What happened?Which itemwas presented? The difference must primarily lie in how the system arrives at the answer.
Cognitive Psychology can, supposedly, provide the relevant instruments. So, no wonder that one of its most impressive ﬁnd-
ings, mental rotation, has such appeal in this context. The critical point is not that mental rotation can provide the correct
same–different judgments—there may be inﬁnitely many computationally equivalent ways. It is the pattern of reaction
times that tells us that the answer is arrived at by mental rotation as we subjectively experience it. However, even the reac-
tion time pattern is not a fail safe indicator of prospection.
Several species of animals can give correct responses, e.g., pigeons, but do not show the same linear pattern of reaction
times with angle of rotation (Hollard & Delius, 1982). Their visual system directly provides rotation invariance and they do
not have to mentally simulate perceiving a hypothetical rotation. However, the reaction times of baboons (Vauclair, Fagot, &
Hopkins, 1993), a sea lion (Stich, Dehnhardt, & Mauck, 2003) and a lion-tailed macacque (Burmann, Dehnhardt, & Mauck,
2005) also show some signs of the linear relationship with angle of rotation, though their times deviate from the human
pattern in ways adaptive for their respective perceptual environment. For argument’s sake let us assume their reaction
times showed exactly the same pattern. We could still not conclude that these animals project themselves as perceivers
of hypothetical rotation events (mental time travel). Their visual system might provide rotation invariance but processing
time happens to depend on angle of rotation. Thus, the ultimate justiﬁcation for interpreting the linear reaction time pattern
in humans as a sign of mental time travel hinges on the fact that this linearity goes hand in hand with the subjective expe-
rience of mental rotation in adults. This relationship between observable answer and subjective experience in adults is not
so tight for other measures. For instance, when asked what to pack for a trip to a place shown in a hibernal scene (Atance &
Meltzoff, 2005) my answer ‘‘winter coat” could be given by projecting myself travelling to that place and noticing the need
for a winter coat. However, it could equally well be based on just knowing that in places like this you need a winter coat.
Mental rotation (provided the linear reaction time pattern does indicate it) is a much less vulnerable indicator of
prospection.
For investigating episodic remembering (retrospection) in animals and young children several proposals have been made.
The technically most sophisticated has been developed by Yonelinas (1999) for distinguishing between recall based on famil-
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2008). Unfortunately the distinction between familiarity of items and recollection of associative information is not quite
the same as between knowing and remembering. Associative information can be known or remembered. We need methods
that drive a wedge between knowing the past and remembering the past. Perner and Ruffman (1995) followed Tulving’s
criterion that free recall produces relatively more experiences of remembering than cued recall. Unfortunately the link to
the one direct method of assessment of the remember–know paradigm remains tenuous (Hamilton & Rajaram, 2003; Jones
& Roediger, 1995; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Perner et al. (2007); our Experiment 2) relied on an objective prerequisite
for episodic remembering, i.e., the direct experience constraint (Stöttinger, Aigner, et al. 2009; Stöttinger, Kaiser, et al., 2009):
only an experienced event can be re-experienced.
Neither of these methods is apt to produce positive demonstrations of a child enjoying a re-experience of a past episode.
These methods only allow an objective test of developmental hypotheses: if some other ability (theory of mind, mental rota-
tion) can be claimed to index the onset of re-experiencing then the method allows for a testable prediction. The development
of the index ability should have a differential effect on recall conditions (free vs. cued; recall of directly experienced vs. indi-
rectly conveyed events).
Although the method falls short of giving a direct existence proof of episodic remembering it does provide an empirical
test of hypotheses about episodic remembering that could also be used on animals. As it has been applied here it requires
some linguistic proﬁciency for the indirect-information condition. It would not work without being able to tell children that
the items shown on the monitor are the same as on the cards they could not see. Indirect knowledge through verbal com-
munication is difﬁcult to use with animals but there are dogs (Miklósi, Polgárdi, Topál, & Csányi, 2000) and goats (Kaminski,
Riedel, Call, & Tomasello, 2005), who understand pointing gestures, and there are chimpanzees who can infer from seeing
that one of two containers is empty that the object must be in the other container (Call, 2004). So, if we can ﬁnd a theory
of which individuals (ontogenetic development, enculturation, evolution) are able of episodic remembering, then we can
provide testable predictions of how these individuals differ in recalling directly observed locations vs. gestured or inferred
locations.
Clayton and Russell (2009) made a new suggestion of how to differentiate knowledge of the past from remembering the
past empirically without use of language. Their minimal requirement for remembering is evidence during re-experience of
the subjective perspective of the original experience. This is clearly a highly relevant aspect—but an important limitation has
to be pointed out. Like the direct experience constraint, this criterion cuts only one way: features of subjective perspective at
recall do not licence claims about re-experiencing. For, perspective features could result from how knowledge of the past is
encoded. To use an example from Davies, Russell, and Russell (2009), children observed how to ﬁx a toy boat by performing
on a left or right lever either a pumping or levering motion. By 3 years most children imitated after some delay a series of two
consecutive actions in the correct spatio-temporal order. The authors suggested that this shows earlier episodic remember-
ing than commonly expected, because children reproduced the temporal perspective of their original experience. The prob-
lem with this conclusion is that the study confounds the subjective order of experiences with the objective knowledge of the
order in which the actions were performed.
What one might be able to do is the following. Let us assume children below 3 years can remember sequences of events to
some degree. One would then have to show that at the purported age of 3 years children show a marked change in the order
in which they recall witnessed events but do not show any change in the order in which they report the events having hap-
pened. This method put together with the direct experience vs. indirect information contrast (Perner et al., 2007) may pro-
vide a more powerful combination. Reports of events need not follow the order of the events. So, particularly strong evidence
would be forthcoming if at the critical age children began recalling events in the order they had been reported rather than
the order in which they happened, e.g., when told ‘‘he ate after his nap” the younger ones recall, ‘‘he slept”–‘‘he ate,” while
the older ones recall, ‘‘he ate”–‘‘he slept”. This kind of reversal would provide an interesting analogy to our ﬁnding that rota-
tors started to have problems with indirectly conveyed events because—our suggestion—they switched from knowledge re-
trieval to episodic remembering.
There has been a certain resentment among animal and infancy researchers against insisting on Tulving’s (1985) and
Wheeler et al. (1997)) criteria for episodic memory because they seem to be impossible to meet for non- or low verbal crea-
tures. With our research and this ﬁnal discussion we want to make the case that to capture the phenomenon of episodic
remembering we need to insist on these criteria but that there is a way of testing theories of when episodic remembering
develops or evolves.Acknowledgments
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Memory items used in Experiment 1, ordered by category. Original German words (English translation)Set 1 Set 2Tiere (animals) Pﬂanzen (plants)
– Schaf (sheep)
– Pferd (horse)
– Schwein (pig)
– Kuh (cow)– Baum (tree)
– Sonnenblume (sun ﬂower)
– Rose (rose)
– Getreide/Weizen (wheat)Gemüse (vegetables) Obst (fruit)
– Karotte (carrot)
– Erbse (pea)
– Zwiebel (onion)
– Paprika (red pepper)– Birne (pear)
– Weintrauben (grapes)
– Kirschen (cherries)
– Apfel (apple)Möbel (furniture) Kleidung (clothes)
– Bett (bed)
– Tisch (table)
– Stuhl (chair)
– Schrank (wardrobe)– Pullover (sweater)
– Schuhe (shoes)
– Socken (socks)
– Hose/Jeans (trousers/Jeans)Gebäude (buildings) Fahrzeuge (vehicles)
– Kirche (church)
– Burg (castle)
– Haus (house)
– Scheune (barn)– Bus (bus)
– Auto (car)
– Lastwagen (lorry/ truck)
– Motorrad (motorbike)Werkzeuge (tools) Musikinstrumente (musical instruments)
– Säge (saw)
– Schaufel/Spaten (spade)
– Zange (pliers)
– Hammer (hammer)– Trompete (trumpet)
– Klavier/Piano (piano)
– Geige/Violine (violin)
– Trommel (drum)References
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